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ABSTRACT

In mobile peer-to-peer networks many service discovery protocols have been
proposed. Most of these protocols disregard the exposure of the participating peers’
privacy details, although they consider the security issues. In these methods, the
participating peers must provide their identities, during the service discovery process, to
be authorized to utilize the service. However, a peer might not be willing to reveal its
identity until it identifies the service providing peer. So these peers face a problem;
should the requesting peer or the service providing peer reveal the identity first, and
hence, this is similar to the chicken-and-egg problem. The protocol presented in Private
and Secure Service Discovery via Progressive and Probabilistic Exposure, solves this
problem to some extent and works considerably to discover the services available in the
user’s vicinity in a single-hop time sync peers only. In this paper, we propose a privacypreserving model based on challenge/response idea to discover the services available in
the mobile peer-to-peer network even when the moving user and the service provider are
at a multi-hop distance away. The performance studies shows that our protocol does this
in a communication efficient way with reduced false positives while preserving the
privacy details of the user and service provider.
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ABSTRACT
In mobile peer-to-peer networks many service discovery protocols have been
proposed. Most of these protocols disregard the exposure of the participating peers’
privacy details, although they consider the security issues. In these methods, the
participating peers must provide their identities, during the service discovery process, to
be authorized to utilize the service. However, a peer might not be willing to reveal its
identity until it identifies the service providing peer. So these peers face a problem;
should the requesting peer or the service providing peer reveal the identity first, and
hence, this is similar to the chicken-and-egg problem. The protocol presented in [12]
solves this problem to some extent and works considerably to discover the services
available in the user’s vicinity in a single-hop time sync peers only. In this paper, we
propose a privacy-preserving model based on challenged/response idea to discover the
services available in the mobile peer-to-peer network even when the moving user and the
service provider are at a multi-hop distance away. The performance studies shows that
our protocol does this in a communication efficient way with reduced false positives
while preserving the privacy details of the user and service provider.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Peer-to-Peer Network (M-P2P) is a decentralized network in which the
mobile peers form an arbitrary network topology. The network is ad hoc because each
peer though willing to forward the data to others can move out of the network and hence
the determination of which peers forward data depends on the network connectivity.
M-P2Ps are becoming increasingly popular in the present day world, though
theoretical and practical limits to the overall capacity of the M-P2Ps have been identified.
This is because of the self-configuring capabilities of the participating peers to form an
arbitrary topology and provide a broad range of services. M-P2Ps are widely used during
emergency situations or military conflicts, because they can be deployed quickly and
requires minimal configuration.
M-P2P provides various services based on the type of mobile peers and the
number of peers present. Any peer in the network can either provide a service or utilize
the service or does both. The number of services available in the network increases with
the increase in the number of peers. Service discovery protocols will ease the process of
manual configurations, by the user, when many services are present in the network. The
service discovery protocols compel the participating peers to expose their private details
like identity. However, the participants might not be willing to reveal their private details
during this process. Even though both the (user and service provider) peers are legitimate,
neither of them wants to reveal their details before the other does, thus can cause a
deadlock situation, similar to a chicken-and-egg problem.
To analyze the problem, consider a service discovery process in M-P2P network,
formed by several peers present in a shopping mall. Assume that a patient and a doctor
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are present in this network and a patient tries to discover a doctor. The patient, while
trying to discover the doctor present in the network, might not be willing to broadcast
his/her identity and health problems in the service request. The patient would like to
authenticate the doctor before revealing his private details. In other words, the patient
will share his/her identity and health problems (private details) only when he/she finds a
legitimate doctor. At the same time, the doctor is not willing to share his/her presence and
identity (private details) in the shopping mall. The doctor wants to respond only to
genuine clients/patients and not to the intruders. In other words, the doctor responds only
to the patients who are authenticated and authorized at his end. In this scenario, both the
patient and the doctor are not willing to share their details until they can authenticate and
authorize the other. In our protocol, these peers (the patient and the doctor) play a game
to authorize themselves without sharing the actual information (identities). Note that
privacy preserving techniques can also be used to authenticate moving UAVs (Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle) where due to security restrictions and communication timeout, secret
keys were not shared and instead, some privacy-preserving techniques with stored states
can be used to establish the authorization.
Protocol presented in [12] works considerably well to discover the services
available in the user’s vicinity. In this approach, users and service providers exchange
partial identities and service information in each round of message transfer. During each
round of message transfers, both the user and service provider verify the partial
information provided by the other. This is done until either a mismatch occurs or
legitimacy reaches a high probability. Identities of the user and service provider are
exchanged in the form of a code word, which is generated by a secret shared between the
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user and service provider. The parts of the code word are exchanged in each round of
message transfer. To generate this code word, both the peers must have synchronized
clocks. Also, the service requests and service information are encrypted before being
exchanged among these two peers.
Though the protocol in [12] solves the chicken-and-egg problem to some extent, it
has some limitations. A user can gain knowledge about the services available at the
service provider’s end causing the privacy breach. Since, partial information is
exchanged among the user and service provider, service provider responds with different
codes when more than one service matches the user’s request. This protocol works
considerably well only when service provider is in the user’s vicinity. The protocol has
high false-positives overhead in the initial stage. Though the process converges, it takes
large number of message transfers to converge. For example, when a user’s request
reaches 500 service providers, it causes an average of 307 replies from these service
providers. Most of these replies are due to false-positives occurred at the service
provider’s end, which is because of less number of bits being exchanged in each message
transfer. Note that in case of moving UAVs, the time is very restricted to authorize other
UAVs in the vicinity and therefore, we need a technique which has very low false
positives and is faster.
In this paper, we propose a protocol to solve the chicken-and-egg problem among
the peers participating in the service discovery protocol. The participating peers can be in
the vicinity of one another or can be at a multi-hop distance. When the peers are at a
multi-hop distance, a broker-based architecture will help each peer by multicasting the
request to the highly ranked peers in the network. Then each participating peer plays a
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game with the peer, in order to authenticate and authorize themselves, before revealing
their private details. The game consists of various message transfers between the user and
service provider and their validation. Each message consists of encrypted masked
information about user/service provider identity and the service request. The game ends
either when a mismatch occurs or when the user has been authorized at the service
provider’s end. Even when a mismatch occur, since all the messages are masked and
encrypted, privacy details of the participating nodes have not been revealed. Our
simulation results show that our approach has high throughput, and requires fewer
number of messages than the Progressive and Probabilistic Exposure approach [12].
Since the complete identities are being exchanged, the probability of false-positives is
less. Our broker architecture also helps in finding the reliable peers who possibly could
provide the service.
Rest of the paper covers Related Work in Section 2, System Architecture in
Section 3, then detail explanation of the protocol and algorithms in Section 4 and 5
respectively. Section 6 explains about the protocols resistance from replay attacks and
MITM attacks while Section 7 proves the convergence of the protocol. The performance
evaluation is given in Section 8 and the paper concludes in Section 9.

2. RELATED WORK
Many service discovery protocols have been proposed. In the insecure networks
[9], service provider will advertise all the services it has, while the users’ multi-cast their
request to discover the services. In traditional service discovery protocols [5, 13], user
will provide his credentials along with the service provider’s address to avail the service.
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In these protocols, the service provider needs to publish/reveal their identities like IP
addresses and the user reveal his credentials to authenticate itself at the service provider’s
end.
In service discovery service protocol [3], service providers will register all the
services with a centralized server. A user can discover the service, by simply querying the
centralized server. However, this protocol depends on a third party (server), and also the
service provider’s service information and user’s service request are revealed during the
process. The Prudent Exposure [11] ensures that only legitimate parties gain the sensitive
information, but peers will authenticate and query all the service providers they have
credentials with during the process. Hence, a peer has to reveal the service request to all
of its service providers which might not be accepted.
In Progressive and Probabilistic [12] approach, users and service providers
exchange partial identities and service information in each round of message transfer
until a mismatch occurs or legitimacy reaches a high probability. As discussed in the
Introduction, though this approach solves the chicken-and-egg problem between the user
and service provider, it has some limitations.
Our work of ranking the nodes in the network based on the type and number of
services a node provides was inspired from the protocols defined in [10, 4]. [10] presents
PeerTrust – a reputation-based trust supporting framework, which include a coherent
adaptive trust model for quantifying and comparing the trustworthiness of peers based on
a transaction-based feedback system and a decentralized implementation of such model
over a structured peer-to-peer network. In [4], nodes (servants) can keep track, and share
with others, information about the reputation of their peers. Reputation sharing is based
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on a distributed polling algorithm by which resource requestors (peers) can access the
reliability of perspective providers before initiating the download from the M-P2P
network.

3. MOBILE PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we will define the key terms used and discuss about the BrokerArchitecture, Broker-set formation, Bootstrapping phase and the system model.
a) Service Provider: A peer that provides a service.
b) User: A peer which initializes the service discovery process and tries to utilize the
service.
c) Broker: A peer that acts as the cluster-head and forwards the service-request queries
to the peers present in other clusters.
d) Intermediate peers: Peers those are present in between the User and the Service
Provider while discovering and utilizing the services.
In an M-P2P network, due to the arbitrary topology and lack of centralized
system, it will be difficult to maintain the details of all the nodes at a particular location.
In order to maintain the service details of all the peers and to utilize the network features
(services) efficiently, we divide the network into a group of clusters. Each cluster is a
collection of peers. All the peers in a cluster can communicate among themselves. Every
cluster will have a special peer node called Broker which acts as the cluster-head.
Cluster-head is selected, based on the reliability and the transmission features among the
peers in the cluster. The Broker will have the complete knowledge of the cluster. It
periodically pings all the peers in the cluster and thereby maintains the information of the
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peers which are moving in and out of the cluster. Broker will calculate the ranking
information of each peer present in the cluster. It increases the rank of a peer whenever
the peer provides a service successfully.
This kind of architecture, known as Broker-Architecture, was introduced in [8], in
which among a group of brokers present in the network, the one with lowest broker_id is
selected as the Master Broker. A slight variation of the Broker-Architecture defined in [8]
is being used in this paper. In our model, a Broker is selected based on the peers’
reliability and the transmission features.
Broker-Architecture (shown in Figure 1) provides some advantages like a) Scalability: As the network grows, information about newly joined peers is
maintained only at the brokers. This will help to manage the peers’ information
efficiently and incorporates the load balancing in the network.
b) Reduces Network Traffic: Broker will multi-cast all the service requests received, to
the top ranking nodes, instead of flooding the network.

Legend
Brokers
Peers

Figure 1: System Architecture
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c) Improves Latency: The response time for discovering a service in the network reduces
because every service request is passed through the Broker and the Broker has some
knowledge about the services available in the network.
We assume that all the wireless links are bi-directional and peers can
communicate omni-directional. A transmission link exists among the two peers if and
only if the peers lie in the transmission range of each other. All the intermediate peers
forward the packets selflessly.
3.1 BROKER-SET FORMATION
Initially all the peers in the network are non-brokers. In the process of selecting a
peer as the cluster-head, every peer in the cluster will participate in the message transfers.
During this process, average ratio of dropped packets to sent packets at each peer (dropto-send ratio) is calculated. The peer with the least drop-to-send ratio is considered to be
more reliable and will be selected as the Broker in that cluster.
Once the broker is selected in the cluster, it will be used as the gateway for all the
requests of the peers present in that cluster. A service request is sent to the broker, if and
only if the peer cannot find the service provider in its vicinity. If the broker moves out of
the cluster, all the peers present in the cluster will again participate in the Broker
selection process.
3.2 BOOTSTRAPPING
Figure 2 shows the bootstrapping phase of the protocol, in which, a centralized
system is used for registering and querying the services. Service providing peers register
periodically their services with the centralized system and users (peers) subscribe for
these services by providing their identities. A service provider provides its identity
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(ServiceProviderID as SPID) while registering its service. For each service subscribed
by the service provider, it will receive the following tuple.
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, SharedKey, UserID_List}
In the above tuple, ServiceID (SID) represents the identity of the service and
SPAliasID (SPAID) represents the identity used by the service provider while providing
this service. All the peers that provide a particular service will share SPAliasID. The
advantage of this is that a user (peer) by knowing this unique SPAliasID can discover all
the service providers, providing that service, present in the Mobile P2P network. Another
advantage of using SPAliasID is, even when a user discovers a service, it will not have
the knowledge of the service provider’s actual identity.

Centralized System

ServiceID (SID),
SPAliasID (SPAID),
PublicKey (SPK)

ServiceID (SID),
SPAliasID (SPAID),
SharedKey (SSK),
User ID’s List
ServiceProviderID
(SPID)
SP
Service Provider registering a
service

UserID
(UID)

User

User subscribing for a service

Figure 2: Bootstrapping Phase

A service provider will use the SharedKey (Private Key as SSK) to decrypt the
messages received from the users. The service providers will get a list of UserID’s which
helps the service provider to authenticate the users in the service discovery process.
However, the service providers must be updated with the latest list of users subscribed to
the service.
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Users subscribe for the services, with this centralized system, by providing their
identity (UserID as UID). On subscription, a user will receive the following tuple.
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, PublicKey}
User encrypts the service request using the PublicKey (SPK) and tries to discover
the service with ServiceID in the network at a service provider with SPAliasID. User and
the service provider use the information gained in the subscription phase during the
service discovery process. A peer (User or Service Provider) will be identified with a
different identity (ID) at different situations, based on the type of service it is providing
or utilizing.
3.3 OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICE DISCOVERY PROCESS
The ranking information of the peers is present at its broker. Initially all the peers
will have the same rank (say zero). The rank of a peer is increased, at its broker, when it
successfully serves a request. The model works on the assumption that, a peer with higher
rank (successfully served many requests) will have the higher probability to serve the
current request.
A user initiates the service discovery process by broadcasting an encrypted
service request. All the peers who receive this request will try to decrypt the message,
using all the SharedKey’s they have. If none of them succeeds in doing so, the user will
send the request to its broker. When a service request is arrived at the broker, it sends the
request to all the peers in the same cluster. If there is no reply from the peers, then broker
sends the request to the highest ranked peer set. If the service is not yet found, then
broker resends the request to the next highest ranking peer set. This process is done until
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the service is found. Brokers will send the request to the highest ranking nodes by finding
the routes (between user and the service provider) using the DSR [6] protocol.
Instead of flooding the service request, multicasting is being used in the above
process which reduces the network traffic. By multicasting the request to the highly
ranked peers, Brokers increase the probability of finding the requested service. When a
peer (service provider) is able to decrypt the service request, it starts playing a game
(discussed in next Section) with the user by sending a reply to the service request. Both
the user and the service provider will play the game to authorize the other. The game will
be continued until both of them are authorized or when at least one of them recognizes
that the other node cannot be authorized.
Once the service is discovered, the rank of the node providing the service will be
increased at its broker and this information is shared among the other brokers. Also, all
the brokers present in the route will cache the route information, which will help in the
future service discovery process.
Peers in the mobile ad hoc network move randomly causing the wireless
connections, between the intermediate peers (peers present on the route between user and
the service provider), to be disconnected. So there is a probability of route failure
between the user and the service provider, during the authentication process (i.e., while
the peers exchange the masked identities). When a route failure occurs, the Broker peer
of the user will find a new route between the user and the service provider, using the DSR
[6] protocol. The Broker, which holds the current masked identities (generation and usage
of masked identities is discussed in Section 4) being used in the game, will resend the last
packet, sent between the user and service provider. By doing so, the peers can still
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continue the game and this keeps the route failure transparent to the user and the service
provider.

4. PrEServD PROTOCOL
In the bootstrapping phase, the centralized system runs the algorithm
GENERATE_KEYS (discussed in the Section 5.1) to generate the tuple shown in the
previous section. After the bootstrapping phase, a peer in the M-P2P network will send a
service-request packet to discover the service, it subscribed for. The service request will
be encrypted with the PublicKey (SPK) obtained from the centralized system. Service
request packet will be generated using the GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (this
algorithm generates the initial masked identities and is discussed in Section 5.2) and will
be of the form,  , 

, where UPK is the User’s Public Key, m1 is the masked

ServiceID and m2 is the masked UserID.
m1 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (SID)
m2 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (UID)
When a peer receives a service request it will try to decrypt the message with all
the available SharedKey’s. If a service providing peer can decrypt the message
successfully, then it can identify the service for which the request has been received. This
is possible because the tuple, received from the centralized system, has a SharedKey that
is paired with a unique service. Once the message is decrypted, the service provider will
have
′

  

′
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Now the service provider will use the COMPARE method to compare ′ with its
service (the service which is paired with the SharedKey used for decrypting the message)
and to compare ′ with the list of UserID’s. Results from both the comparisons
(′  ′  are sent along with newly masked ServiceID (n1) and SPAID (n2).
n1 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (SID)
n2 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (SPAID)
Masking is done using the MASK algorithm, which is discussed later. The packet
is encrypted using the User’s Public key (UPK) obtained from the service request packet.
The reply message will look like:
′ , ′ ,  , 



The service provider will compare ′ with the list of UserID’s (paired with the
service) and a reply message is sent for each comparison. So, for the initial service
request, a service provider will send multiple replies.
At the user end, the received message will be decrypted with the User’s Private
Key. The user will then validate the first two parts of the message ′ , ′  by
equating them with its expected values. If there is any mismatch the user will ignore the
received packet. Only if all the values match then the user will compare ′ with the
requested ServiceID and ′ with the Service Provider’s ID (SPAID) using the COMPARE
method, where
   ′

′
User

will

send

the

results

of

the

  .
compare

method

(′ 

and

′ ) along with the newly generated masked identities m3, m4 (using the MASK
algorithm, discussed in Section 5.4). The packet will be encrypted as
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′ , ′ ,  , 
where m3 = Mask (SID, m1, 2) and m4 = Mask (UID, m2, 2)
where SID, UID are the actual identities of the Service and User respectively; m1, m2 are
the masked identities used in the service request (acts as the current masked identity) for
Service and User respectively and the third parameter “2” represents the number of
iterations i.e., the number of packets exchanged between these two peers.
In this way the user and service provider exchange messages until each one is
authorized by the other or when the reply messages does not have the expected values.
The sequence diagram for the authorization process is shown in the Figure 3.

User
m1 = {GMI(SID)}
m2 = {GMI(UID)}

SP
[UPK, m1, m2]SPK

n1’ = USK(n1)
n2’ = USK(n2)

[R(m1’), R(m2’), n1, n2]UPK

m3 = {Mask(SID)}
m4 = {Mask(UID)}

[R(n1’), R(n2’),m3,m4]SPK

m1’ = SSK(m1)
m2’ = SSK(m2)
n1 = {GMI(SID)}
n2 = {GMI(SPAID)}

Legend:
COMPARE method: R(x) = (WP, CP)
WP – no: of correct letters in wrong position
CP – no: of correct letters in correct position.
UPK – User Public Key
USK – User Private Key
GMI – GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY

Figure 3: Sequence Diagram for the Authorization Process
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5. ALGORITHM FOR PrEServD PROTOCOL
In this section, we will discuss algorithms used in our protocol to discover the
services in a network. GENERATE_KEYS algorithm is run during the bootstrapping
phase at the centralized system to generate the tuples (discussed in Section 3.2
Bootstrapping).
GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY is used by both the user and the service
provider to generate the initial masked identity of the service, the user and the service
provider. COMPARE is used to check the distance between the identity, present in the
message received at a node, and the corresponding actual identity. If the results of the
COMPARE algorithm are same as the expected values at a node, then MASK algorithm is
run at that node to generate new masked identity, which is used in the further message
transfers.
5.1 GENERATE KEYS PROTOCOL
This algorithm in Figure 4 is run by the centralized system for every subscription
of a user or for every service registry by a service provider. The input for this algorithm is
the identity of user/service provider along with the subscription or registry information.
As discussed in the bootstrapping phase, the service provider will receive the following
tuple as an output from the GENERATE_KEYS algorithm:
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, SharedKey, UserID_List}
A user subscribed for a service will receive the following tuple as an output from
the GENERATE_KEYS algorithm:
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, PublicKey}

17
These tuples are used by the service provider and the user during the service
discovery process to authenticate one another.

GENERATE_KEYS: This algorithm runs at a centralized system to subscribe users for a service or to
register a service provider’s service.
Input: Node’s identity and whether the peer registers a service or subscribes for a service.
(nodeID, type)
Output: {ServiceID, SPAliasID, SharedKey, UserID_List} or {ServiceID, SPAliasID, PublicKey}

GENERATE_KEYS (nodeID, type)
{
IF (type = registry)
{
IF (newService)
{
Generate a random identity for the service (ServiceID)
Generate a random identity for the Service Provider (SPAID)
Select a random Public-Private (SharedKey) key pair
}
ELSE
{
Retrieve the ServiceID
Retrieve the SPAID
Retrieve the SharedKey
Retrieve the List of User’s subscribed
}
}
ELSEIF (type = subscription)
{
Retrieve the ServiceID
Retrieve the SPAID
Retrieve the PublicKey
}
}

Figure 4: Generate Keys Algorithm
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5.2 GENERATE MASKED IDENTITY PROTOCOL
This algorithm in Figure 5 is run at the User end to generate the masked identity
of the service and the user. These masked identities are used in the initial service request
packet. This algorithm is also run at the service provider’s end to generate its masked
identity which is used in the first reply of the service request.
Example: Assuming the length of the identities (peer and service) to be 6, let’s say user
picks two random numbers for Expected_CP and Expected_WP between 1 and 3.
Expected_CP = Random (1, 3), Expected_WP = Random (1, 3)
Here CP and WP stand for “number of correct letters in correct position” and
“number of correct letters in wrong position” respectively. CP and WP can be understood
clearly from the COMPARE method discussed in Section 5.3. Now to generate the initial
masked identity, let’s pick the positions of the letters randomly.
Loop ‘Expected_CP’ times
randomPositions = Random (1, 6)
Loop ‘Expected_WP’ times
randomLetters = Random (1, 6)
Using these values the user will generate the initial mask identity for a service.
For example, let AICH5K be the actual id of a service, Expected_CP = 2, Expected_WP
= 1, randomPositions = {3, 5} and randomLetters = {6}. We can observe that the degree
of set (array) randomPositions is 2 which is equal to Expected_CP and the degree of set
(array) randomLetters is 1 which is equal to Expected_WP, as expected from the
algorithm.
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GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY: This algorithm runs at the user and the service provider to create the
initial masked identities.
Input: Identity of a User or a Service or a Service Provider to be masked. (ID)
Output: Masked identity of the input. (MaskedIdentity)

GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (ID)
{
Expected_CP = Random (1, i) // “i” is a random number less than “n”
Expected_WP = Random (1, i)

LOOP Expected_CP times
randomPositions = Random (1, n) // “n” is the length of the Identity
LOOP Expected_WP times
randomLetters = Random (1, n)

ActualIdentity = ID
MaskedIdentity = “” // initially empty string

FOREACH position in randomPositions
MaskedIdentity[position] = ActualIdentity[position]

FOREACH letterPosition in randomLetters
MaskedIdentity[Random(1,n) – randomPositions] = ActualIdentity[letterPosition]

LOOP index = 0 to MaskedIdentity.Length
IF (MaskedIdentity[index] == “ ”)
MaskedIdentity[index] = Random(0-9,A-Z)

RETURN MaskedIdentity
}

Glossary of terms and functions:
1)

Random (x,y) is a function that returns a random integer between ‘x’ and ‘y’.

2)

All identities are Strings and Identity[i] represents the character at ith index in the string “Identity”

3)

“randomPositions” and “randomLetters” are the Integer Arrays

4)

“Random(1,n) – randomPositions” returns an integer between 1,n and which is not present in the array
‘randomPositions’

5)

“Random(0-9,A-Z)” returns either an integer between 0 and 9 or an alphabet between A and Z.

Figure 5: Generate Masked Identity Algorithm
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Since ActualIdentity is AICH5K, the number of correct letters in correct
positions is 2 (Expected_CP) and their positions are 3 and 5. So MaskedIdentity is --C-5-.
The number of correct letters in wrong positions must be 1 (Expected_WP) and
the letter at the actual position is 6. Next pick a random number from 1 to 6 except 3 and
5 (Random(1,n) – randomPositions) to place the letter at position 6 of the ActualIdentity.
Say the random number is 1 and so the position 1 in MaskedIdentity must be filled with
the letter at position 6 in ActualIdentity. Therefore, the MaskedIdentity is K-C-5-. Now
fill the empty positions with some random alphanumeric letter to get the initial masked
identity for the service, as KZCX54.
Similarly the initial masked identities are generated for UserID and
ServiceProviderID at the user and service provider respectively. The initial service
request packet from the user will contain the masked identities of the requested service
and the user along with the user’s public key.
5.3 COMPARE PROTOCOL
The COMPARE algorithm in Figure 6 basically checks the distances between the
provided identity and available identities. For example, if the service ID (SID) of a
particular service is “FLWRE9”. The user masks this particular ID into “LABRE0”.
When we compare the actual ID and masked ID, we can see that “L” is present in the
masked ID but in the wrong position where as “R and E” are present in the correct
position and rest of the letters in the masked ID are not matching with the actual ID. So
the user expects a 2 for CP and a 1 for WP (CP – the number of correct letters in correct
position, WP – the number of correct letters in wrong position).
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COMPARE: Returns the distance between the identity received in the message and the corresponding actual
identity.
Input: Actual identity and the received identity (ReceivedIdentity, ActualIdentity)
Output: CP (number of correct letters in the correct position) and WP (number of correct letters in the wrong
position) in the received identity.

COMPARE (ReceivedIdentity, ActualIdentity)
{
LOOP index_RI = 1 to ReceivedIdentity.Length
{
LOOP index_AI = 1 to ActualIdentity.Length
{
IF (ReceivedIdentity [index_RI] = ActualIdentity [index_AI])
{
IF (index_RI = = index_AI )
CP++
ELSE
WP++
}
}
}
RETURN (CP, WP)
}

Glossary:
“Identity[i]” represents the character at ith index in the string “Identity”

Figure 6: Compare Algorithm

At the service provider’s end, when it receives a message, after decrypting the
packet it calculates the distances (WP and CP) for both SID and SPAID. The results are
sent in the reply to the user. When the user gets the reply from the service provider, it
compares the values of WP and CP in the reply packet with that of its expected values. If
they are equal, then the communication continues until the user is authorized or a
mismatch (of WP/CP) occurs. The user is said to be authorized when WP = 0 and CP = 6
(assuming the length of the SID is 6).
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5.4 MASK PROTOCOL
At a peer, if the values in the received packet and the values expected for CP, WP
are same then the MASK algorithm in Figure 7 is run to generate new masked identities.
At a peer, MASK algorithm uses the knowledge gained from the previous masked
identities it encountered during the service discovery process as explained in the
following example.
In the example discussed in GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY, for the
ServiceID A1CH5K, we have generated KZCX54 as the initial masked identity, which is
sent in the service request by the peer. Now, the peer will expect the reply message with a
(2, 1), for (Expected_CP, Expected_WP). If the reply message has the same values as
(Expected_CP, Expected_WP) then the user will generate new masked identities (m3, m4)
using the MASK algorithm. For example, if the user receives (2, 1) as the reply then the
peer will jumble the positions of “C” and “5” and might also include another new letter in
correct position, so the node will have a new masked id m3 = ACX4Y5. The MASK
method is used by both the user and service provider to generate the new masked
identities in every message transfer.

6. RESISTANCE TO REPLAY ATTACKS AND MITM ATTACKS
In this section, we will explain in detail how our protocol prevents the replay
attacks [14] and man-in-the-middle attacks [16].
6.1 REPLAY ATTACK
Consider peers Alice, Bob and Mallory (an intruder) present in the network. Assume
that, Alice is subscribed for a service (say service X) at Bob and is trying to discover this
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MASK: At a node, if the values received in the packet and the values expected for CP and WP are same then the
MASK algorithm is run to generate new masked identities.
Input: Actual identity, corresponding current masked identity and the number of iterations done so far.
(ActualID, currentMaskedID, noOfIterations)
Output: Newly masked identity. (newMaskedID)

MASK ( ActualID, currentMaskedID, noOfIterations) {
newMaskedID = “” //Initially empty string
IF (noOfIterations < 3) {
LOOP index = 0 to ActualID.Length
newMaskedID[index] = currentMaskedID[Random(1, ActualID.Length)]
} ELSE {
newLetter // represents the letter added from ActualID
randomNumber // represents the position of the “newLetter”
usedLetters [] = RetrieveCPWP(ActualID, currentMaskedID)

LOOP index = 0 to ActualID.Length
randomNumber = Random(1, ActualID.Length)
IF (ActualID[randomNumber] NOT IN usedLetters)
newLetter = ActualID[randomNumber]
BREAK

newMaskedID[randomNumber] = newLetter

FOREACH position in usedLetters
newMaskedID[position] = ActualID[position]
LOOP index = 0 to ActualID.Length
IF ( newMaskedID[index] == “ ” )
newMaskedID[index] = Random(0-9,A-Z)
}
RETURN newMaskedID
}
Glossary of terms and functions:
1)

“Random(x,y)” returns a random integer between ‘x’ and ‘y’

2)

“usedLetters” is a character array that holds the characters that are common between ActualID and
currentMaskedID.

3)

“RetrieveCPWP(ID1, ID2)” is a function that returns the common characters between ID1 and ID2.

4)

“Identity[i]” represents the character at the ith index in the string ‘Identity’.

5)

“x NOT IN Y” returns true if character ‘x’ is not present in the array ‘Y’.

6)

“Random(0-9,A-Z)” returns either an integer between 0 and 9 or an alphabet between A and Z.

Figure 7: Mask Algorithm
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service X. In order to discover the service X, Alice will create a request packet (which
contains the masked identities of SID and UID) and broadcasts the same. Bob processes
the received packet, creates a reply packet and sends it to Alice. Alice processes the
received packet (checks for the match in (CP, WP)), creates a new reply packet and sends
it to Bob. This continues until both the peers are authorized at one another (from the
assumption, they will be authorized).
Assume that, Mallory eavesdrops the conversation between Alice and Bob and
tries (in the future) to get authorized at Bob using the packets stored from this session.
So, Mallory starts broadcasting the service request packet, then Bob will process it and
sends the reply (this reply packet consists of newly generated masked identities and so
Bob’s expected values changes). Mallory sends the next packet it stored (from the AliceBob session) as a reply. But, when Bob processes this packet, there will be a mismatch
between the values received in the packet and the values Bob expects. So, Bob will stop
communicating with Mallory and Mallory will not be authorized for the service X.
From the above example, we conclude that an intruder can never be authorized if
it tries to retransmit the packets it obtained by eavesdropping because a peer generates a
new reply packet (with new masked identities and expected values) for every packet
received.
6.2 MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
The man-in-the-middle attack [16] is a form of active eavesdropping in which the
attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between
them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private
connection when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. The attacker
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can control the conversation if it can intercept the public-keys of the nodes participating
in the conversation.
In PrEServD protocol, peers will obtain the keys during the bootstrapping phase
and these keys are used in order to authenticate one another. Also, all packets are
encrypted and decrypted only at the User/SP (endpoints) restricting the intermediate
nodes to intercept the packets. So, when an intruder in the network tries to eavesdrop
during a service discovery process, it cannot intercept the packets because it cannot
decrypt them. An intruder can only forward the received packet or it can try to retransmit
the packet at a later point of time. But as discussed in Section 6.1, the intruder will not be
authorized for using these services.

7. PrEServD PROTOCOL CONVERGES
In this section, we discuss the transfer of messages among the peers and
mathematically prove the convergence of our protocol.
In the service discovery process, a peer (user) initiates a service request message.
In response to this request message, a user will receive many replies from other peers in
the network. These peers and the user play a game (by exchanging messages) in order to
authenticate each other to utilize the service, provided each of them are authorized to do
so. Let us consider replies from only one peer (say service provider) in order to keep the
convergence proof simple.
In response to the service request message from the user, a service provider might
reply with multiple messages (say n1) and the user receives these n1 messages. The user
processes the received messages and responds to the messages that have the expected CP
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and WP values. Suppose the user replies back with n2 (n2 ≤ n1) messages in response to
the received messages, then the service provider will process these received n2 messages
and responds back to the messages that have the expected CP and WP values. If the
service provider replies with n3 messages (again n3 ≤ n2) and say it receives n4 messages
so on and so forth until both the service provider and the user are authenticated. When the
user is authenticated at the service provider, they stop playing the game and the number
of messages being transferred among these peers will become zero. Also, whenever the
values of the CP and WP are not same as that of the expected, the peers stop
communicating for that particular reply.
Formally, if ni represents the number of messages exchanged in ith iteration and nj
represents the number of messages in jth iteration between the two peers, then
    

!

where i, j " N (N is the set of Natural Numbers)
If f(x) is a function, which represents the number of replies a peer sends, it is
clear from the above argument that f(x) is a monotonically decreasing function and is
non-negative. So, we can state that
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By using the Integral Test for Convergence [15], “A non-negative monotonic
decreasing function f defined on an unbounded interval [Z, ∞) converges iff the integral
on f is finite, where Z is an integer”, we can prove that f(x) converges. In our case, Z = 1
and integral of f is
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value. Hence, from the Integral Test for Convergence, the PrEServD protocol converges.

8. SIMULATION
We built a simulation environment to study the experiments conducted using the
PrEServD protocol described in Section 4 and Progressive Approach [12] protocol.
The simulation area is approximately 1000 X 600 m2 and it can afford a range of
30 to 120 peers in the network. The maximum connection distance between any two
peers is 100 m. List of the simulation parameters are provided in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter

Range

Simulation area

1000 X 600 m2

Number of peers

30 ~ 120

Maximum Connection distance

100 m

The simulation environment is built with varying number of nodes in the network.
The movement of the nodes is handled by implementing the random way point model
(RWP) [1]. In RWP, each node moves along a zig zag line from one way point to the
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other. The random way points are uniformly distributed over the given area and all the
nodes tend to converge at the center. But this type of model has some common problems.
When we take the average speed of a node, it tends to decay over a period of time and
eventually approaches zero. RWP chooses a destination and speed for a node randomly
and independently, and the node will keep moving at that speed until it reaches that
destination. A common problem arises when a node moves very slowly for a given long
destination which it reaches after a very long time, which increases simulation time. To
overcome such a problem, we have used a slight variation of RWP in which we consider
a new parameter, time. To overcome the average speed decay problem, we randomly
choose speed which is uniformly distributed in the interval [1, Vmax) instead of (0, Vmax)
used previously. This ensures that the average speed does not tend to zero.
The formation of the node cluster (Broker architecture) is handled by
implementing a Connected Dominating Set (CDS) [7] model. Several algorithms for the
CDS formation have been discussed in [2], we have used Steiner tree based CDS
construction to define Broker nodes in the network.
8.1 PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Simulation is performed to evaluate the performance of the PrEServD protocol.
We compare throughputs, latency, number of messages transferred and false-positives in
discovering services available in Mobile P2P network using the protocol defined in [12]
and PrEServD protocol. We also study the performance of our protocol when the states
(information of the current masked identities) are not stored.
8.1.1 Throughput: We define, Throughput as the ratio of the number of requests
satisfied to the number of requests initiated in the network. Figure 8 shows the
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comparison between the throughputs of both the protocols. The readings are taken in a
network with 60 nodes and each node subscribed to a maximum of 30 services from the
available 100 services. The number of requests initiated in the network varies from 5 to
25.
In both the protocols, when a user broadcasts a service request packet, all the
neighboring nodes will process the packet independently and concurrently. So, a single
service might be found at multiple neighbors, which might result in discovering more
number of services than requested. Also, if the service is not available in the vicinity,
PrEServD protocol will try to discover the service in the entire network, unlike
Progressive Approach. Hence, throughput of the PrEServD protocol is better than the
Progressive Approach.
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Figure 8: Throughput for PrEServD and Progressive Approach
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8.1.2 Messages Broadcasted during Service Discovery: We compare the number of
messages transferred/broadcasted in each protocol during the service discovery process.
Figure 9, shows comparison between the number of messages broadcasted in PrEServD
protocol and Progressive Approach in a network with 60 nodes while increasing the
number of requests from 5 to 25.
With increasing number of requests, the number of messages broadcasted in the
network increases for both the protocols. But the number of messages broadcasted in the
Progressive Approach is very high, compared to PrEServD protocol, because of the lesser
numbers of bits being transmitted in each message resulting in a large number of falsepositives. In the next section, we discuss the percentage of false-positives and compare
the same for both the protocols.
8.1.3 Percentage of False-positives: In PrEServD protocol, a participating peer
compares the Expected(CP, WP) values with the received(CP, WP) values and replies for
a match. A match can be either a true-match or a false-positive. A match is defined as a
true-match, when it occurs between the received(CP, WP) values (of the actual UserID or
ServiceID) and the Expected(CP, WP) values. All other matches are considered as falsepositives.
As explained in Progressive Approach [12], the number of false-positives
decreases exponentially for a single service request but the total number of messages
broadcasted in the network is very high due to these false-positives which can be seen in
Figure 9. Figure 10 compares the percentage of False-positives for both the protocols. We
can observe that most of the messages broadcasted in the Progressive Approach are
because of the False-positives (it is close to 90%).
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Figure 9: Message Transfers in PrEServD and Progressive Approach
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Figure 10: False-Positives in PrEServD Protocol and Progressive Approach
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From Figure 10, we can also see that very less number of false-positives occur in
PrEServD protocol. The reasons are twofold. One is that the information in PrEServD
protocol is sent with complete masked identities instead of partial identities. Two, more
levels of comparisons are required in PrEServD protocol to identify a match which
results in lesser number of false-positives, unlike the Progressive Approach.
8.1.4 Energy Consumption: The energy consumed for a service discovery process is the
cumulative energy consumed at all the participating peers. The energy consumed at a
peer depends on factors like reception power (the number of messages it receives),
processing power (power consumed for computations) and transmitting power (number
of messages it transmits). So, the Energy Consumed is directly proportional to the
number of messages being broadcasted in the network and the number of nodes
participating.
The readings are taken in a network of size 60 and the energy consumed for
discovering a service is calculated using the following equation:
01

 2 3 4 5 4 6 4   2  3 4 5

where ‘n’ represents the number of messages broadcasted,
‘t’ represents the energy consumed for transmitting a single message,
‘r’ represents the energy consumed for receiving a message,
‘p’ represents the energy consumed for processing a message.
‘m’ represents the number of intermediate nodes (nodes participating in the
discovery process other than user and service provider).
The first part of the equation can be explained by the following argument: The
user and the service provider will receive process and transmit exactly half the total
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number of messages broadcasted. The second part of the equation explains the energy
consumed by the intermediate nodes and each intermediate node is involved in
transmitting and receiving messages.
For PrEServD protocol, the readings are taken for both the regular approach and
by restricting the discovery process to single-hop (similar to Progressive Approach). In
the regular approach ‘m’ is greater than zero while ‘m’ becomes zero for the restricted
approach and Progressive Approach. Figure 11 shows that the energy consumed for
discovering the services is high for PrEServD protocol compared to that of the
Progressive Approach. This is because more number of peers’ participate in the service
discovery process and each peer contributes to the total energy consumed. The energy
consumed by the PrEServD protocol (restricted to single-hop) is comparatively less due
to the fact that lesser number of messages are transferred in the service discovery process.
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Figure 11: Energy Consumption for PrEServD (single-hop, multi-hop) and
Progressive Approach
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8.1.5 Latency: We compare latency, the average-time taken (in milliseconds) for
discovering a service, for the two protocols. Figure 12 compares the average-time taken
by the two protocols for discovering five services while increasing the number of peers in
the network ranging 20 to 100. Figure shows that, the latency for the PrEServD protocol
is little high, this is because PrEServD tries to discover the service in the whole network
(services which are multi-hop away) when the service is not available in the user’s
vicinity whereas the other protocol only finds services within a single hope.
The results from Figure 12 signify that the average-time taken for discovering a
service is less in PrEServD protocol, when restricted to a single-hop. This is because
lesser number of messages are transferred in PrEServD protocol compared to Progressive
Approach.
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Figure 12: Latency for PrEServD Protocol and Progressive Approach
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8.1.6 Restart Rate: In M-P2P network, peers move randomly causing the wireless
connections, between the intermediate peers (peers present on the route between user and
the service provider), to disconnect. Though, we keep these disconnections transparent to
the user and the service provider (as discussed in Section 3.3) by storing the states
(information of the current masked identities) in PrEServD protocol, we also studied our
protocol without storing the states. That is, we restart a service request whenever the
wireless link between the user and the service provider disconnects during the service
discovery process and we define, Restart Rate as the number of requests restarted over
the total number of requests.
We plot a graph for the restart rate (shown in Figure 13); in a network with 60
nodes while increasing the number of service requests from 5 to 40. We compare the
results for various node mobility rates. Node mobility rate (X %) is defined as the
percentage of total number of nodes moving randomly in the network at any point of
time.
From the Figure 13, we observe that as the number of service requests increases
the number of requests restarted also increases. We note that when the network has at
least 20% of the nodes moving, an average of 11.25 requests are restarted for every 40
requests initiated, which is about 28.12% of the total requests. By restarting these
requests, more network resources are being utilized and the latency is also increased
while maintaining the throughput. In order to overcome this, we store the information of
the states and there by utilize the network resources very efficiently.
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a protocol that ensures privacy between the peers
participating in the service discovery process. The peers reveal their identity
progressively (by playing a game) until they are authorized. We defined the broker
architecture that helps in organizing the network and discovering the services that are at a
multi-hop distance away from the user. We also discussed how the protocol prevents
replay attacks and MITM attacks. This protocol can be applied in any scenario, where the
two communicating parties (peers) are not willing to reveal their identities, like blind
dating, car pooling etc.
Simulation results prove that the PrEServD protocol is much more efficient than
the Progressive Approach [12]. Our algorithm provides much better throughput, and
energy consumption and the latency of our protocol is only little high though our protocol
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can discover a service which is multiple hops away. Also, our protocol converges and
requires very less number of message transfers for the same resulting in very less number
of false-positives.
In our protocol, a new user might not be authorized at a service provider though it
is subscribed for the service. This is because the service provider might not have the
latest/updated list of users subscribed to the service. As a future work, we will provide a
new approach to generate tuples at the broker so that the service providers will have the
updated list of the users’ subscribed. Also, by generating the tuples at the broker, we can
renew the keys paired with the service.
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